Richard Perle served as assistant secretary of Defense for strategic
affairs during Ronald Reagan¹s administration. As a private citizen, he
chairs a policy advisory board for the U.S. Department of Defense. Heritage
editor-in-chief Donald H. Harrison interviewed him at the La Jolla Torrey
Pines Hilton on Tuesday, Dec. 3, prior to Perle¹s speech at a United Jewish
Federation dinner for major donors. A transcript follows

Harrison: There really are two questions I wanted to get into with you. The first is Iraq and Israel, and what you foresee is the role that Israel can or should play, and what the United States would expect of Israel, if there is a war. And the second area I would like to discuss with you is your views on the current administration and its feelings toward the Jewish community and its issues. So, let's start with Iraq. Last time (in the Gulf War of 1991), Israel had to sit by and receive a few Scuds so there wouldn¹t be an alliance broken up. What do you see this time if it does come to war?

Richard Perle Herb Targum photo

Perle: In 1991, Saddam fired 30-something Scud missiles at Israel and no one died as a result. One person suffered a heart attack in the midst of a missile landing very near his apartment, but there were no fatalities directly attributed to that, so it was relatively easy for Israel not to
take an action against Saddam. And I think they were persuaded that if they did so, they ran the risk of at least changing the political character of the war. I believe that was overemphasized. It may not have been a significant risk at that point in the conduct of the war; the coalition had
enough momentum to see things through to conclusion. So I don¹t think it was crucial that Israel chose not to respond, but it would not have made much sense for Israel to respond given the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi attacks. This time, of course, the great concern is that he will again use Scud missiles, but with chemical warheads, even biological warheads. And clearly
if he were to inflict a large number of casualties in Israel, then the Israeli government like any other government would feel compelled to respond. Where the diplomatic subtlety comes into this equation is discouraging Saddam from making that attack in the first place on the grounds that
whereas it might not be militarily effective, it could affect the politics of the war in progress.
So I think the Israelis are right to remain largely silent about what they would do, not to engage in any public discussion about the ranges of options available to them. I have no doubt that Saddam understands that if he inflicts significant casualties in Israel, Israel will inflict significant
casualties on Saddam. While I am skeptical of "deterrence" as a means of controlling Saddam Hussein, I think the Israelis can almost certainly deter using weapons of mass destruction.

Q: As this plays out, Saddam firing missiles at Israel, he's calculating that the rest of the Arab world will then see this as "us versus the Jews of Israel." How sophisticated an analysis is that on his part?

A: I don¹t think it is terribly sophisticated, to tell you the truth. It rests on the simple notion that other countries can't figure out where their own interests lie in relationship to an event as significant as a war in the neighborhood. And I think the other countries are pretty good at
understanding where their interests lie. So the question is, will they go off in some emotional, irrational tangent because Israel has responded to an attack on Israel, and I am not at all sure that is true. I know that is the standard thinking. It would be so transparent that it is hard to believe
that it would have a really significant effect.

Q: And that was your thinking concerning 1991?

A: Yes, that was pretty much what I thought in 1991, but as there was little that Israel could contribute to the overall war effort at the point at which the Scud missiles were fired, the Israelis probably did the right thing. There will be potentially similar questions this time—that is, what could Israel do to hasten Saddam's demise that the United States would not already
be doing? And it is not obvious to me that Israel will have a lot to contribute there. Israel certainly has the right to deter an attack on itself by making it clear that it will respond.

Q: What did the Allies do in 1991? I suppose at some point you could say that everybody else was redundant with a superpower opposing Iraq.

A: I think by the time the ground forces went in, the war was essentially over. So much damage had been done from the air that there was little resistance. Popular resistance here and there. You had Iraqi units surrendering to journalists—I have lived in Washington where everybody
surrenders to journalists; it is not demeaning to surrender to journalists. But, seriously, Iraq is no match for the United States. We don't need a lot of help in order to deal effectively with Saddam. We don¹t need anything like the coalition that was necessary in 1991, because in 1991 we mobilized a massive force that required massive logistical support, bases from which to operate, ports into which the flow of materiel could be sustained and so forth. Any action this time would be much smaller in scale but even more effective because we are much better at it than we were.

Q: Do you see some scenario, some understanding, developing between the United States and Israel concerning the "what ifs" of this situation— what if they fire a missile at Israel, and Israel decides to respond; how can it respond without endangering U.S. troops or efforts? Is there, to your knowledge, some sort of understanding?

A: Yes, I don¹t know about the planning details, but I would think it would make sense for both countries to have thought this through and discussed it, so that decisions don't have to be made in real time without some background.

Q: Even in your advisory role with the Defense Department, you are not absolutely certain this is already in place?

A: No, I haven¹t asked what planning has been done there. By and large, for my own reasons, I have avoided getting into what the President plans because I am out speaking all the time about Iraq. It is better that I not be current on operational plans.

Q: What is your overall theory about what is likely to happen? Do you see war as being inevitable at this point?

A: War is never inevitable. On the other hand, it seems likely that Saddam will continue the pattern of recent years, which is not cooperating, certainly not giving up the weapons of mass destruction that he has already accumulated in his efforts to acquire more of them. And President Bush has made it pretty clear that either he disarms totally or he will be disarmed.

Q: Do you think the United States is also prepared to win the peace and stay in there?

A: I do. The attitude that has sometimes existed in the past, that we don't want to be involved in nation-building—we should, when we do use military forces, go in and out as quickly as possible — I think that kind of simple notion has given way to more sophisticated feeling for what it takes to secure American interests. It would not be a success if we left prematurely before there was stability and then saw the whole thing collapse.

Q: Do you see a model like Germany or Japan after World War II, or maybe what has occurred in Afghanistan?

A: There is a lot of talk about this and somebody was saying the other day that he thought Italy was the better model. When we went into Italy, (Benito) Mussolini was hanging from a lamp post. We stayed for a little while. We brought some stability into the place. We helped the Italians get things sorted out and then we left. It was neither a Japanese occupation,
with (Gen. Douglas) MacArthur essentially rewriting the Japanese constitution, or a German occupation, with John McCloy serving effectively as the— well, "proconsul" doesn¹t quite do justice to the job he did after the war. None of these models can be picked up and imposed without modification. The Italian one, because it was a gentle administration until Italian politics
could begin to function, as least as well as it does, that might be the model. I am more optimistic than many people about the ability of the Iraqis to put together a decent alternative to Saddam Hussein.

Q: Let's move on to Topic B, the relations of the Bush administration with the Jewish community.

A: I think this administration has been terrific with respect to the Jewish community and Israel in particular. I know there were a lot of misgivings, some memories of the first President Bush and some policies from that administration, particularly what amounted to a lot of pressure on Israel
and the fears that something like that would happen again. It hasn't happened. On the contrary, President Bush is strongly supportive of Israel's efforts to deal with terrorism. It is despite the enormous pressure on the President to put pressure on Israel. He has not done that. He has nudged them occasionally, but nothing that could be described as real pressure. In fact, the people who have been complaining that they have been pressured are the Palestinians, and (Yassir) Arafat in particular. So I think Bush has really been terrific, and I think it flows from conviction. It flows from a genuine affection for Israel, and I think that is something to do with his
own faith. So I hope that— although I am not so optimistic— I hope that the Jewish community will recognize that and give him a reasonable degree of support in the next election. That is very hard to get much above 25 percent if you are a Republican.

Q: Why are father and son so different in this regard?

A: I think they are entirely different people. The father grew up in Kennebunkport (Maine) and George W. grew up in Texas, so that is a pretty big difference right away. They are entirely different personalities. I knew Vice President Bush when I served in the Reagan administration, when he was Vice President, and I had some occasional contact with him as President. I was involved in the (George W.) Bush campaign early on, so I was down in Texas, participated in some meetings with him. He is tough-minded; he cuts right to the heart of an issue, and the idea that he isn¹t smart, I don't understand that. He is very smart.

Q: Perhaps because he struggles with his grammar?

A: Well, it is true there is a tendency to associate a certain rhetorical style with intelligence, but it's a big mistake. People have strengths in different things. You don¹t go to Yale undergraduate and get an MBA at Harvard if you are a dummy. And the fools that say "well, that just shows
you can buy your way in," well, that¹s rubbish. He is a very smart guy. I watched him in situations where he was being asked to absorb a lot of material, much of it new, and he is like a sponge.

Q: You mentioned that part of his affection for Israel is his faith. A local controversy has been how to relate to the Evangelical Christian community, whom some credit as being very important to shaping the administration's policy toward Israel. What is your take on evangelical Christians, the Christian Right, George Bush and Israel?

A: I think the Christian Right — I am not sure exactly what is meant by that— but they and evangelical Christians are not necessarily the same thing. The evangelicals take a view of the Bible and biblical truth that produces an affinity with Israel. It is a very welcome development. They are the only natural defenders of Israel with the Jewish community. The politics would be quite different (without them). The evangelicals make an enormous difference. So I think that kind of support should be welcomed. It is genuine, it is heartfelt, it doesn't come with strings attached. We should be grateful for it. You don¹t have to support the social ideas of the Christian Right in order to receive gratefully whatever support is offered by the evangelicals, or even by Christian conservatives. You don¹t have to buy ... their views.

Q: You can be pro-choice and still have an ally concerning Israel?

A: I have no problem, none at all. I come from Washington, where you make alliances all the time. You can't be so rigid that you say I can't agree with anyone unless they agree with everything. That certainly isn't a key to success. You¹ve got to, on some issues, ally with them, and other issues you oppose. So yes, you can be pro-choice and welcome the support of them on Israel.

Q: I see we¹re being signaled concerning the time. Is there something you
would like to add to this interview?

A: I do think that the removal of Saddam has the potential to usher in a period in the region of much greater promise. Things are terrible between Israel and the Palestinians. I don't see any prospect that they will get better any time soon. They certainly won¹t get better under Arafat.
Saddam Hussein has been encouraging resistance to any movement toward a peaceful resolution. He has been sending checks to the families of suicide bombers— in effect rewarding suicide bombers— and his removal I think would be a tremendous encouragement to people throughout the region who are suffering under dictatorships. They will have seen the most brutal of all
the dictators fall, and I think it would be a signal for movement in a more democratic direction over the long term.

Q: Thank you very much.